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Fach year, thousands of tons of food are provided to disaster-hit developing countries, primarily be means of food aid 
programs such as the U.S. Food for Peace (P1.480) Program and the World Food Program of the United Nations. In the 
past, in-depth needs assessment and evaluation studies of the real impact of these programs on the societies they tire 
intended to help have been virtually non-existent. Recent experience and a growing understanding of the problems 
involved in the provision of food aid indicate that the strategies used and the basic assumptions under which these 
programs operate should be evaluated and revised. Increased awareness of the types of clisasters, of their effect on local 
food production and distribution systems, and of the options available to meet the needs of the affected population could 
substantiallv reduce the incidence of massive food importation and its negative impact on a developing society.
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INTRODUCTION
1 ,h:1i year, millions of tons of food are supplied by 
food-exporting nations to the developing coun­
tries. A substantial portion of this food is made 
available after disasters with the intention of pro­
viding emergency and post-disaster supplies to 
replace food stores lost in the disaster. The United 
States. Canada and Australia are the world's 
largest suppliers of emergency food aid. Last year 
alone, the United States, through its PL480 prog­
ram (Food for Peace), supplied 328,000 tons to 
disaster-hit nations! The U.S. PL480 program 
and the World Food Program of the Lhiited 
Nations are the two most important sources of 
supply. With the growing humanitarian concern 
about world hunger and the recent awareness of 
the role that disasters play in the cycle which 
retards economic and social development proces­
ses, the amount of food aid which will be available 
m the future is projected to increase.
In recent yeats, there has been a trend for post­
disaster food aid programs to continue long past 
the initial emergency period. Droughts in the 
Sahel, failures of the rice crops in India and Bang­
ladesh in past years have convinced many program 
administrators that a disaster will have a long-term
t  Figure supplied by Food For Peace Office, U.S. Agency for 
Intel national Development, based on FY78 (Oct. 1, 1977- 
Sept 3u, 1978).
effect on food needs in a region, and that food aid 
should be continued until such time as food sup­
plies are restored and the markets are fully back in 
operation.
The mechanisms which exist for supplying 
emergency food aid following disasters have been 
set up to meet short-term humanitarian objectives, 
based upon certain basic assumptions. The first 
and foremost of these assumptions is that the disas­
ter victim luis lost his supply of food in the disaster. 
The second is that normal distribution systems are 
totally disrupted and will be unable to function. 
The third assumption is that, due to the disaster, 
the victims will not have the capital necessary to 
b.s- food, even if it were available.
Due to the nature of most emergency and post­
disaster programs, few sophisticated evaluations 
of the impact of food supplied after a disaster have 
been conducted, and the above assumptions have 
gone virtually unchallenged. Only in the last sev­
eral years hits there been a growing concern on the 
part of administrators that the overall impact of 
post-disaster food imports may have far greater 
negative than positive effects. From this growing 
concern, six major questions have arisen:
Is food aid necessary?
What is the social and economic impact of
large-scale food programs on a country’s
development?
Is the food provided appropriate?
I . C. C UN'!
II the food is necessary, how will it he provided? 
Does the provision ot tood aid alter a disaster 
speed or delay recovery?
W hose needs does a tood program meet?
DISASTERS AND FOOD NFFDS:
THE ISSUES
In orderto understand some of the factors at play, 
it is necessary to examine several different types of 
disasters. I he tour disasters that cause the most 
concern are earthquakes, large-scale floods (espe­
cially those caused by cyclonic storms), prolonged 
civil distrubances, and droughts. (AID, 1976)
Case I: Earthquakes
Earthquakes are particularly violent disasters 
and can affect extremely large regions. In 
Guatemala in 1976, over one-third of the coun­
try's population lived in structures which were 
damaged or destroyed by the earthquake. 
Thousands of people were killed, and transporta­
tion and communications were disrupted through­
out the entire country. On the surface, such a 
disaster would seem to meet the criteria for mas­
sive importation of food: and indeed, a number of 
agencies immediately began planning food prog­rams.!
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c) a I buildings, bridges, etc., ma\ be destroyed, but 
iarely are lood supplies affected. In the case of 
Guatemala, most of the food was still in the fields, 
as yet unharvested; thus food was still available. 
What was needed w as a place to store the food, and 
the rapid restoration of the market network to 
ensure that food supplies could be distributed. The 
harvesting and marketing of the food is the prim­
ary economic endeavor of the majority of the peo­
ple living in the affected area. Even after the disas­
ter, el forts to harvest, transport and market food 
took precedence over everything except immedi­
ate medical needs. In every location, functioning 
markets were in operation long before massive 
amounts of food could have been distributed by 
outside donor agencies. Nonetheless, several 
agencies continued their plans to import food, I
I Among the U.S. agencies providing food aid were: CA R E, 
Catholic Reliel Services. Church W orld Service, The Salvation 
Army and Direct Reliel foundation.
some on the assumption that it was needed, and 
others in an eltort to improve the nutrition levels 
of the people throughout the disaster-affected reg­ion.
Two things should be mentioned here. First, the 
large-scale importation that was planned was 
viewed with alarm by the small farmers and the 
government.$ They reasoned that large amounts 
ot tood would substantially lower the price the 
small farmer would receive for the food he had 
produced. This concern was so great that several of 
the relict agencies, after failing to persuade the 
others to stop their food programs, attempted to 
stabilize prices by constructing large silos and buy­
ing food at the pre-disaster price. Second, those 
agencies that wanted to improve the nutritional 
level, using the disaster as a vehicle for initiating 
change, were working against tremendous odds. 
Experience during the past few years has shown 
that the primary concern of the disaster vietim is to 
return to normal as quickly as possible, and that 
change instituted during a disaster rarely takes 
hold.§
Case //. Civil War
Food importers argue that such a conflict, espe­
cially it it is long-term, disrupts transportation and 
local markets; if the fighting is widespread, it may 
''Fo disrupt farming. This rationale was used by 
ucies for importing massive amounts of 
-wing the civil war in Lebanon in 1976— 
7 /. In the case of Lebanon, they also argued that it 
is a food-importing nation even during the best of 
times; therefore, massive emergency supplies 
would be necessary in the post-conflict period.
However, the Lebanese situation differed from 
what was immediately evident. First, even during 
the high points of the fighting, scarcity of food had 
never been a problem. Each faction in the civil war 
had to depend upon the loyalty of non-combatants 
within their area of operation and, thus, elaborate 
and rather sophisticated schemes were developed 
to ensure that food supplies flowed even through 
the worst of the fighting. Marketing and transpor-
f ” 1 he Appropria tenessol PI 4K0 Pood Donations Alter the 
1976 Earthquake and in Non Disaster Times,” edited inter­
view with Francisco Balzibal Pablo and Benito Sieajan Sipae, by 
Robert ( ie rsony  and Tony Jackson, C 'h imaltenango, 
Ciuateinala, October 1977.
S "  Disaster and Coping Mechanisms in C akehiquel 
Ciuateinala: I lie C ultural Context,” Dr. Margaret Kieffer, 
IN T E R JE C T , 1977.
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union lit food from rural areas were indeed dis­
rupted; hut in most eases the farmers were able to 
eultivate and harvest basic toodstulfs and to store 
them sat'elv until the transportation systems were 
restored. Immediate needs alter the lighting 
ceased were met In this reserve of food which 
became available when the lighting stopped.
Nevertheless, major relief organizations 
immediately initiated large-scale importation ol 
food for the war victims. The food was distributed 
through the network established by each ol these 
organizations and not through normal markets.t 
Concern immediately arose on the part of the lar- 
mers about the impact of this food on prices.$ They 
needed to market their own surplus in order to be 
able to recoup expenses lost during the periods of 
lighting. In order to stabilize prices and guarantee 
a fait price to the farmers, the government initi­
ated a price support program. But what about the 
fact that Lebanon is normally a food-importing 
nation? While the country does import large 
amounts of food, it is connected to other countries 
in the Middle East by an intricate import/export 
network. Post-disaster food programs operated 
outside this network and, had sufficient quantities 
been imported in this manner, it would have had a 
decidedly negative impact on the recovery of this 
vital economic system. Had this been coupled with 
a widespread lethargic agricultural recovery, the 
net result could have produced disastrous conse­
quences for years to come.8
( Use III: f loods
Flood situations are often cited as a justification 
for post-disaster food programs; this type of disas­
ter does destroy food supplies and creates an 
immediate need lor lood tor the disaster victims. 
I he primary question in this case is not whether 
the food is needed, but rather which sources 
should provide il and through which mechanisms 
should it be distributed.The cyclone and tidal wave which struck Andhra 
Pradesh, India, in November 1977 piovides an 
excellent recent example. The tidal wave and high
i Information taken Irom reports oi l R S. W orld Food I’ rog- 
rnm a ml l  IN It 1 I to the ( ommiUee ol V o i un.il.ny Agencies m 
Lebanon. Decem ber l ‘l 7b.
:|: I rom a disaster assessment report to Save ilie ( hildren 
l eilcialion by Charles MacCormack, SCI Program Director, 
December |b7b.
§ The fact that more food aid was not provided is a tribute to 
the coordination eflorts of the American Council ol Voluntary 
Agencies in New York.
winds accompanying the cyclone generated floods 
which destroyed between 70 percent and 90 per­
cent of food supplies in the area where the cyclone 
came ashore. I lie tidal wave itsell struck an area 
approximately 30 km. long and 15 km. wide. 
Flooding in the remainder of the cyclone-affected 
region did extensive damage in an area of approx­
imately 500,000 acres (1171 square miles)—a 
very substantial area, especially when examined 
on-site.|| To put the damage in perspective, how­
ever, the total area affected by the tidal wave rep­
resents less than two percent ol the total irrigated 
area within the two districts where it struck. Within 
the entire state of Andhra Pradesh, the area 
affected by both wind damage and the tidal wave 
makes up less than ten percent of the total area 
under cultivation. While there was an immediate 
and pressing need for emergency food supplies in 
the cyclone-affected region, the surrounding area 
was largely unaffected.There was a good crop in 1976 and again in 
1977, and surplusses were available. India has a 
food bank for regional supplies, and the foodstuffs 
in it were relatively unaffected by the storm. The 
questions which faced program administrators 
were: Where should the food be obtained? How 
could equal distribution be assured? Should food 
be imported from outside the country, should it be 
purchased in surrounding markets, or should it be 
transferred from the food bank? Or should local 
markets in the affected areas be stimulated with 
cash so that normal market activities could take 
care of the food deficiency? Those agencies that 
considered importing food implied that such prog­
rams would be able to deliver food taster and more 
efficiently than would in-country purchase of food 
from existing stocks or stimulation of local mar­
kets. (In this case, massive importation would not 
have been more rapid. I he roads were quickly 
restored; few vehicles were destroyed by the cyc­
lone; and food began arriving from surrounding 
areas at a very rapid rate.)The dearth of available captial for food pur­
chases encouraged several agencies to consider 
food for-work programs, while others argued that 
this in itself was another incentive lor importing 
food. Again, the question of what effect tood- 
for-work or outright gifts of food would have on 
the local food producers and markets was hotly 
debated.
|| Taken I rom data provided in U S. A I D. Sit rip No. 5, 
Decern be i IM77; Irom local reports; and from on-site inspec­
tion.
Several agencies decided that food distribution 
programs ot any type would be a disincentive and ottered instead labor-intensive projects which 
generated much-needed capital in the area. Their 
reasoning was that money injected into the area 
would have a tar greater (and decidedly more posi­tive) impact on recovery than would simple food distribution programs.
Case IV: Droughts
Finally, there is the special case of drought and 
massive crop failures. In these cases, are there 
adequate supplies and marketing mechanisms necessary to meet demands? The long drought in 
Sahelian Africa saw millions of tons of food- 
imported over a seven-year period to supply the 
victims. There is no doubt that thousands of lives were saved due to this effort. But again, haunting 
questions remain. Did the imported food have a 
negative impact on the marketing of food that was 
available and that was produced in the region? Did 
the means by which the program was conducted 
and the way the food was distributed prove to be a 
disincentive to marginal farmers, adding those 
people to the ranks of refugees? Was the imported food similar to that to which the refugees were 
accustomed? Could food have been purchased in 
neighboring countries that were not affected by the drought?
1 here is no doubt that, from the relief agencies’ 
point of view, it was simply easier to purchase food 
supplies in the exporting countries and ship it in.t I he question remains: does a decision based on 
ease of administration serve the needs of the victim or the donor?
These questions and many others relating to the .Sahel will take years to answer. But with the grow­
ing sophistication about how food is produced, and 
die necessity tor working through local systems iather than outside of them, the resulting perspec- i ive is likely to be a condemnation of the wholesale importation of food
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I rom past experience, then, what are the major 
lessons relating to the provision of food following
t  I or more complete information see: International Disaster 
AYspome I lie Sahelian Hxfteriem e , Barbara J. Brown, Janet C. 
ludiill, and K. Thomas Rowe, University of Denver, JuneI ‘>70.
disasters? For example, what is the effect of a 
disaster on food needs, and when is the provision of food really necessary?
In order to further understand these issues, it is necessary to divide disasters into two categories: 
cataclysmic disasters, and long-term continuing 
disasters. In the cataclysmic disaster, there is usu­ally one large-settle event which occurs, doing most 
of the damage and destruction. Following this 
single event, there may be a tremendous amount of 
suffering and chaos, but generally things begin to 
get better as time passes. In a continuing disaster, the situation remains constant or may even 
deteriorate as time passes. Cataclysmic disasters 
include earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, cyclonic storms and floods. Continuing disasters include 
prolonged civil strife, crop failures and droughts.
The damaged area in a cataclysmic disaster is 
usually relatively small, while the area affected in a 
continuing disaster can be extremely large. In terms of food and food distribution, cataclysmic 
disasters are normally more disruptivethandes- 
tructive. For example, they may disrupt the trans­
port of goods and the marketing system. They can 
disrupt or damage irrigation systems. To a limited 
extent, they do destroy food supplies, but the amount of destruction depends on the season, the 
location of the disaster, and the total area affected. 
On the other hand, continuing disasters not only 
disrupt transportation and distribution networks, 
but can often bring them to a long halt and ulti­
mately destroy the system itself. (An excellent 
example is the effect of the drought on the tradi­
tional barter/exchange system of the Taureg nomades in Niger. Due to the extended drought, 
many Tauregs were forced to become sedentary and to enter the money economy.)
When, then, is food necessary? Food must be 
provided whenever victims are denied long-term access to normal markets, or when the local mar­ket system is not capable of meeting the demand 
for food. In the vast majority of cases, these condi­tions exist only in the continuing disaster.
1 he next question for an administrator is: What is the best form of food assistance? There are no 
simple answers to this, and the easy acccssof many 
Private voluntary agencies to PL480 and World 
Food Program stocks has obscured the realization that simple food distribution programs may not be 
the best answer and that other options exist. In 
most disasters, agencies find themselves respond­
ing to a problem by addressing the products of that 
problem rather than its causes. Most agencies are
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so blinded by the short-term immediate needs that 
they tail to examine closely the impact of the prog­
rams they develop to alleviate shoit-term needs, 
and they tail to examine the long-term impact of 
the program on the affected society.
If the food programs developed after disasters 
have had such a negative impact on the societies 
they were intended to help, why are they con­
tinued0 First of all, the sophistication required in 
assessing the impact of these programs has only 
recently been developed. In the past, the cause- 
and-effect relationships at play (and especially the 
long-term impact of these programs on a society, 
both socially and economically), have not been 
well understood, nor have they been closely 
examined. Interest in this field has only recently 
become more widespread and as yet, few of the 
agencies involved in food distribution programs 
have acquired the capabilities to conduct such 
assessments.
Secondly, agencies are often caught in the 
"speed" syndrome. A disaster creates tremendous 
pressures within an organization to respond 
quickly, to make its choices about program options 
rapidly, and generally to get tilings moving as 
quickly as possible. Pressures are exerted by the 
disaster victims themselves, the local government, 
the press and, most importantly from the agencies’ 
point of view, by the agencies’ donors. Agencies 
fear that, if they do not take immediate action, 
both the opportunity and the funds will not be 
available at a later date. In this rush to action, 
needs assessment and sophisticated analysis of 
existing supplies, maiketing systems, etc., go by 
the wayside.t
Public pressure exerted on an agency to import 
food alter a disaster is based on a misunderstand­
ing ol both actual needs and of the problems 
involved in this type of program. The general 
public labors under a very unsophisticated set of 
assumptions about developingcountries, and surp­
asses from the industrialized countries are often 
seen as a simple expedient for solving Third World 
problems. All the major relief and development 
organizations must be called to task for their fail­
ure to communicate the realities to their donors 
and to the public at large.
t  Theiv  is much tulk about improving the disaster assessment 
capabilities ol rebel agencies. While this is certainly worth- 
w bile, a better approach would be to improve their understand­
ing ol an area long bel'ote a disaster strikes. In short, il an 
agency has not been involved in an area before a disaster 
occurs, it should not at tempt to intervene m the post-disaster 
period.
There is a final factor which serves to perpetuate 
food aid programs, and it is this factor which has 
drawn most of the recent criticism. The food aid 
system has built-in incentives that reward massive 
distribution of surplus food. In the U.S. PL480 
program, tor instance, an agency that distributes 
PL480 lood receives not only the food for distribu­
tion but also money for support of the staff 
involved in the distribution and a grant proportional 
to the tonnage delivered to defray overhead 
expenses. For some non-profit orgnaizations, this 
arrangement can be a godsend; and a number of 
agencies receive a substantial portion of their 
operating funds for simply administering the vari­
ous PL480 programs. There is nothing, of course, 
which would prevent an agency from purchasing 
post-disaster food supplies locally or from the sur­
rounding area. But when presented with a choice 
of expending funds to do so with no cash return, or 
utilizing PL480 foodstuffs and receiving, in effect, 
a bonus for doing so, it can be seen that the PL480 
program is a disincentive to agencies which would 
otherwise use their resources to stimulate recovery 
of local food distribution systems.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
What then is the future of food aid programs fol­
lowing disasters? Most assuredly, criticism will 
continue to mount not only concerning the way 
food programs are administered, but also concern­
ing the impact they have on the societies they are 
intended to help. The essential question will be 
raised time and again: Whose needs does the prog­
ram meet—those of the disaster victims, the donor 
agencies, or the food producers of the industrial­
ized nations?
Matty disaster experts predict a trend away from 
the provision of post-disaster food assistance, 
toward the provision of capital-intensive projects 
after a disaster that will help re-start the normal 
food distribution processes. Other disaster special­
ists are calling for increased awareness of the 
opportunities available in adequate pre-disaster 
planning/mitigation measures to prevent large- 
scale lood shortages following a disaster. For 
example, they point out that those areas that are 
subject to drought and/or crop failures are, even in 
the best of times, marginal areas; these areas can 
be identified long before a disaster strikes and 
agencies can work to improve the agriculture in
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t he sc regions so that the e fleets of a disaster can he 
reduced, if not eliminated.
There are no simple answers to the issues raised 
in the provision of food aid. lint it is vital that these 
issues fie confronted and examined. Our under­
standing of both disasters and the impact of disas­
ter assistance programs must continue to increase
if meaningful changes are to he made in the inter­
national relief system.
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